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Abstract
Vaudenay’s cryptanalysis to Chor-Rivest cryptosystem is not applica-
ble if the parameters p and h of the finite field are both prime integers.
This case is analyzed below and the parameters for which such cryptosys-
tem is cryptographically interesting are listed. Regrettably the resulting
cryptosystems are not very efficient in practice.
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1 Introduction
As is well known, the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem (see [3, 4]) is based on the Bose-
Chowla theorem and the arithmetic of the Galois field GF
(
ph
)
. The public
key of this cryptosystem is defined as (c0, . . . , cp−1, p, h), where ci = bi + d,
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d ∈ [0, ph − 2] play the role of noise, bi = api(i), with pi a permutation of the set
{0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, and ai = logg (t+ αi), where GF
(
ph
)
= {α0, . . . , αp−1}, g is
a generator of GF
(
ph
)∗ and GF (ph) = GF (p)[t], deg(t) = h.
The first efficient attack for the proposed parameters (i.e., p ∼= 200, h ∼= 24,
in [3, 4]) has been obtained in [14], assuming h has a small factor.
The knapsack cryptosystems of density < 0.94 are known to be insecure
after the classical attacks ([2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11]). The density of Chor-Rivest cryp-
tosystem is usually high; in fact, they are 1.077, 1.139, 1.278, and 1.280 for the
parameters originally proposed in [3, 4]. Hence, the aforementioned attacks do
not apply to it, but Schnorr and Ho¨rner ([7, 13]) have been partially successful in
breaking Chor-Rivest cryptosystem for a certain percent of keys in GF
(
10312
)
and GF
(
15116
)
. Remark that such parameters are still far from those originally
proposed.
In the present work we consider the case of prime parameters p and h, in
the range determined by the present computational limitations, which is the
remaining case in Vaudenay’s attack.
2 The range 1044 < n < 1060
Vaudenay’s cryptanalysis ([14]) of the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem ([3, 4]) essen-
tially reduces it to the case in which p as well h are both prime integers.
In this section, we analyze the prime values for p and h such that
(1) h ≤ p,
(2) 11 ≤ h ≤ 31,
(3) 1044 < ph − 1 < 1060,
(4) The smoothness of n = ph−1 is equal to or less than 1013, i.e., the greatest
prime factor of ph − 1 has 13 decimal digits at most.
Remark We should remark on the fact that the items (1), (3) and (4) imply
h ≤ 31. Actually, from (3) we deduce h log p ≤ 60. If h ≥ 41, then p ≤ 29,
2
thus contradicting (1). If h = 37, then p ∈ {37, 41, 43}, but the smoothness
of n for these three cases is much bigger than 1013. In fact, the least one is
1024 and it corresponds to the case p = 43. The cases h ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7} are not
considered in item (2) as they provide too long public keys, violating the re-
quirement of section 3. In fact, the least public key bit length is about 3·108 bits.
We denote by D the set of pairs (p, h) satisfying the conditions (1)-(4) above,
the list of which is given in Table 1. The following properties are obtained:
(a) #D = 175.
(b) If Dh = {p ∈ Z : (p, h) ∈ D}, then D = D11 ∪D13 ∪D17, where #D11 =
150, #D13 = 24, and #D17 = 1.
(c) The smallest prime integer p111 ∈ D11 is p111 = 10169, and the greatest one
p11150 ∈ D11 is p11150 = 233113. Similarly, we have p131 = 2549, p1324 = 39343;
and p171 = 409.
(d) The number of bits, bji , of the public keys (c0, . . . , cp−1, p, h) corresponding
to the primes p111 , p
11
150, p
13
1 , p
13
24, and p
17
1 , are as follows:
b111 = 1494861, b
13
1 = 377268, b
17
1 = 60546
b11150 = 45923283, b1324 = 7829277.
In what follows we justify why the items (3) and (4) are needed.
The number of digits for ph−1 proposed originally by Chor and Rivest ([4])
is 56, 56, 58, and 60, corresponding to the pairs (197, 24), (211, 24), (35, 24),
and (25, 25), respectively. On the other hand, if the number of digits for ph − 1
is small enough (in fact p = 13, h = 12, see [13]), we know that the algorithm
by Schnorr and Ho¨rner breaks the cryptosystem for a significant number (42%-
76%) of public keys chosen at random. Moreover, the greatest value for (p, h)
to which the aforementioned algorithm applies is (see [7]) p = 151, h = 16, but
only 10% of public keys are broken for these parameters.
3
Both cases above are not specially interesting as they are covered by Vaude-
nay’s attack, but the method of Schnorr and Ho¨rner can be efficient for prime
values of (p, h) within the range of such authors. In any case, the number of
digits of n in all the cases considered in [7] and [13] is not greater than 35.
These facts justify the choice of the pairs (p, h) satisfying the conditions
(1)-(3) above: Such values of the parameters lie approximately in the original
range proposed by Chor-Rivest, but they are far from the parameters affected
by Schnorr-Ho¨rner cryptanalysis.
Item (4) is included because of computational feasibility. In fact, the running
time for computing a discrete logarithm in GF (ph)∗ is known to be (see [12,
3.65])
O
(
r∑
i=1
ei (log2 n+
√
pi)
)
group multiplications, where n = pe11 · · · perr is the prime factorization of the
order of the group.
Moreover, a group multiplication in GF (ph)∗ costs O
(
(h− 1)2 (log2 p)2
)
bit
operations (cf. [1, 6.2.1] and [10, I,§1]). Hence, if B denotes the smoothness of
n, then the previous formula allows us to estimate the running time of a discrete
logarithm in GF (ph)∗ as
(log2 n)
3
(
log2 n+
√
B
)
log2B
.
In addition, if we assume that the number of bit operations per day in a
standard PC is 1012, then in the range of item (3), we obtain B < 1013.
3 The key size
The sizes of public keys in the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem are usually much
greater than the sizes of those for RSA and ElGamal PKCs. In fact, for the
original parameters proposed in [4], denoting by b(p, h) the bit length of the
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public keys corresponding to (p, h), we have
b(197, 24) = 36064, b(211, 24) = 39259,
b(243, 24) = 46426, b(256, 25) = 51470.
As we have shown in item (d), in the range 1044 < n < 1060 there is a unique
pair (p, h) for which the size of its public key is similar to the greatest one of the
four cases above; namely, p = 409, h = 17, for which b(409, 17) = b171 = 60546.
A reasonable bound for the bit length of the public key should be 70000, as
this is near to the double of the least bit length of the original values for (p, h).
We have searched for the prime pairs (p, h) such that 1044 < n, h ≤ p,
and the bit length of its corresponding public key is not greater than 70000.
Among these pairs, those not included in the range defined by items (1)-(4),
are given in Table 2, where d (resp. B = 10s) denotes the number of digits
(resp. smoothness) of n. The relevant fact is that none of such pairs has a
smoothness ≤ 1013; i.e., the item (4) does not hold. Actually, the least value
for the smoothness of such pairs is 1018, corresponding to p = 173, h = 29.
4 Conclusions
(i) A unique prime pair (p, h) exists in the range (1)-(4) and with a bit length
for the public key parameters slightly greater than those proposed orig-
inally in [3, 4]; namely, p = 409, h = 17. Moreover, we have that the
number of digits of n is 45, the smoothness is 1010, the bit length of the
corresponding public key is b171 = 60546, the density of the cryptosystem
for such parameters is bounded from below by 2.77, and the factorization
of n is
n = 40917 − 1 = 23 · 3 · 172 · 103 · 307 · 443 · 3163 · 43283 · 47363·
55217 · 21906541 · 329083009.
(ii) Although Vaudenay’s cryptanalysis to the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem does
not include the case of prime parameters (p, h), the results above actu-
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ally show that the cryptosystem is useless nowadays due to the present
computational limitations, which essentially affect the size of the public
key and to the smoothness of n, because of the complexity of the discrete
logarithm problem.
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p h p h p h p h p h
409 17 2549 13 2593 13 2659 13 2707 13
3323 13 3547 13 4999 13 5059 13 5413 13
5807 13 6247 13 8443 13 9467 13 10169 11
10333 11 10487 13 11083 11 11783 13 11789 11
11927 11 12109 13 12413 11 12119 13 12163 13
12919 11 13033 11 13099 11 13499 11 13687 11
13721 11 13907 11 14081 11 14347 11 14407 13
14537 11 14731 11 14753 11 15277 11 15361 11
15809 11 17183 11 17299 11 17359 11 17389 11
17509 11 18121 11 18353 11 18401 11 18691 13
19433 11 20287 11 21031 11 21061 11 21377 11
22543 11 22963 11 23333 11 23629 11 23633 11
25457 11 25693 11 25763 11 26489 13 28001 11
28027 11 28219 11 28477 11 28537 11 29879 11
30367 11 30649 11 32533 13 33247 11 33829 11
33967 11 35809 11 36013 11 36563 11 37529 11
38431 11 38833 13 39343 13 39953 11 40151 11
40787 11 41057 11 41957 11 42737 11 44389 11
44543 11 45413 11 46447 11 47917 11 48907 11
51239 11 53551 11 55439 11 56897 11 58907 11
62497 11 64033 11 64403 11 65099 11 66821 11
68113 11 68749 11 70199 11 70249 11 70607 11
72379 11 74027 11 74597 11 75181 11 76831 11
77291 11 79133 11 79973 11 83089 11 83423 11
88969 11 89231 11 90971 11 92381 11 92647 11
92723 11 92849 11 95369 11 95393 11 95581 11
97729 11 98869 11 99787 11 100189 11 101411 11
102217 11 104381 11 104953 11 108761 11 111773 11
119233 11 121501 11 124489 11 124699 11 131479 11
135403 11 144481 11 149173 11 152407 11 153911 11
157897 11 159073 11 163901 11 167269 11 167971 11
172849 11 181757 11 183089 11 184211 11 185987 11
192149 11 205391 11 207293 11 209563 11 211039 11
211949 11 213359 11 215801 11 219823 11 221203 11
221411 11 221567 11 229819 11 231131 11 233113 11
Table 1. Values of the pairs (p, h) verifying the conditions (1)-(4)
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p h d s p h d s p h d s p h d s
109 29 60 38 113 29 60 50 127 29 62 41 131 29 62 41
137 29 62 51 139 29 63 33 149 29 64 29 151 29 64 62
157 29 64 20 163 29 65 39 167 29 65 43 173 29 65 18
179 29 66 51 181 29 66 30 191 29 67 34 193 29 67 38
197 29 67 55 199 29 67 20 211 29 68 55 223 29 69 35
227 29 69 51 229 29 69 67 233 29 69 45 239 29 69 94
241 29 70 40 251 29 70 53 257 29 70 32 263 29 71 46
269 29 71 30 271 29 71 25 277 29 71 33 281 29 72 63
283 29 72 69 293 29 72 29 83 31 60 22 89 31 61 53
97 31 62 47 101 31 63 25 103 31 63 38 107 31 63 28
109 31 64 40 113 31 64 44 127 31 66 64 131 31 66 64
137 31 67 32 139 31 67 56 149 31 68 26 151 31 68 60
157 31 69 49 163 31 69 45 167 31 69 40 173 31 70 53
179 31 70 37 181 31 70 41 191 31 71 45 193 31 71 34
199 31 72 49 197 31 72 69 211 31 73 49 223 31 73 56
227 31 74 30 229 31 74 33 233 31 74 45 239 31 74 23
241 31 74 72 251 31 75 63 257 31 75 29 263 31 76 42
269 31 76 30 271 31 76 34 277 31 76 71 41 37 60 49
43 37 61 24 47 37 62 50 53 37 64 43 59 37 66 30
61 37 67 65 67 37 68 46 71 37 69 38 73 37 69 43
79 37 71 41 83 37 72 36 89 37 73 25 97 37 74 72
101 37 75 42 103 37 75 39 107 37 76 71 109 37 76 52
113 37 76 74 127 37 78 60 131 37 79 34 137 37 80 42
139 37 80 61 149 37 81 70 151 37 81 67 157 37 82 36
163 37 82 35 167 37 83 77 173 37 83 40 179 37 84 61
181 37 84 65 191 37 85 57 193 37 85 28 197 37 85 45
199 37 86 68 211 37 86 47 223 37 87 25 227 37 88 56
229 37 88 26 233 37 88 55 239 37 89 60
Table 2. Values of the prime pairs (p, h) verifying 1044 < ph − 1, h ≤ p, and b(p, h) < 70000
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